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The article provides a bridge between recent marriage market re-
search and studies of welfare incentive effects on U.S. family forma-
tion. Estimates from state and county fixed-effects models indicate
significant effects of changing state Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, food stamps, and Medicaid expenditure levels on county-
level changes in families headed by unmarried mothers. However,
neither changing welfare benefit levels nor declining economic and
marital opportunities could account for recent increases in female
headship. The results imply that large additional cuts in welfare
payment levels would lead to only small reductions in the percentage
of female-headed families with children.
INTRODUCTION
The transformation of the family has continued apace in the United
States. Between 1970 and 1993, the percentage of all families (with chil-
dren) maintained by a single mother increased from 11.5% to 25.9%, while
the number of children living with only their mother expanded from 7.5
to 15.6 million (Rawlings 1994; Saluter 1994). The economic and social
costs have been large. A disproportionate share of children raised in
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female-headed families experience chronic poverty and various deleteri-
ous developmental and behavioral problems, including poor cognitive and
emotional development, teenage pregnancy, and school dropout (Amato
1993; McLeod and Shanahan 1996; McLanahan and Sandefur 1995). In-
deed, female-headed families have experienced exceptionally high rates
of poverty—about 50%—over the past two decades (Casper, McLanahan,
and Garfinkel 1994; Lichter 1997). They also have comprised the over-
whelming share of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the cash assistance program that was the nation’s largest prior
to implementation of new welfare reform legislation in early 1997.2
From a public policy standpoint, it should come as no surprise that
marriage is increasingly viewed as a panacea for poverty and other social
problems (Blankenhorn 1995; Popenoe 1996; Waite 1995). The current
retreat from marriage and the decline in the two-parent family have rein-
vigorated research on the etiology of family formation in the United States
(e.g., Cherlin 1992; Qian and Preston 1993). Much of the interest has cen-
tered on the role played by demographic shortages of “marriageable men”
and the rising employment and earnings of women (e.g., Wilson 1987;
Wood 1995). At the same time, recent trends have raised new questions
about whether past and current welfare policies and public assistance pro-
grams (e.g., AFDC participation and benefit levels) have undermined tra-
ditional patterns of family formation, while encouraging nonmarital fertil-
ity, divorce, and the growth in female-headed families with children
(Moffitt 1994, 1995; Schultz 1994).
The main objective of our article is to provide a bridge between recent
research on local marriage markets (South and Lloyd 1992; Lichter, An-
derson, and Hayward 1995) and studies of welfare incentive effects on
family formation (Ellwood and Bane 1985; Duncan and Hoffman 1990).
Specifically, we estimate and compare the effects of changing state AFDC
benefit levels, food stamp benefits, and Medicaid expenditures, as well as
changing economic and marriage market opportunities, on recent area-
level changes in female-headed families. Our goals are (1) to document
the rise in female-headed families (for non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and
Hispanics) during 1980–90 for all U.S. counties, (2) to evaluate, for the
first time, competing explanations (e.g., welfare incentives to nonmarriage
2 The new program is called Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) in the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. In the early
1990s, only about 8% of recipients received cash payments as married persons through
the AFDC-Unemployed Parents program. This program provided married couples
with assistance during spells of unemployment if they met certain eligibility require-
ments regarding previous work histories (i.e., the 100-hour rule). One purpose of this
program was to reduce family stress during periods of economic hardship and prevent
marital disruption and divorce.
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versus mate unavailability) of increasing local-area female headship rates,
and (3) to estimate various cross-state and cross-county fixed-effects mod-
els of family formation (Moffitt 1996). Research on the rise in female-
headed families with children is propitious in light of current welfare de-
bates centered on the possible implications—both good and bad—of the
newly enacted welfare bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND FEMALE HEADSHIP
The retreat from marriage is inextricably linked to the growth in the num-
ber and percentages of female-headed families (Lichter 1995; Smith, Mor-
gan, and Koropeckyj-Cox 1996). Nearly one-third of all babies today are
born out of wedlock and roughly 30% of all nonmarital births are to di-
vorced women (Ventura et al. 1995). Among blacks, increases in nonmar-
riage (rather than increases in nonmarital fertility rates) have accounted
for the overwhelming share of the post-1960 rise in the nonmarital fertility
ratio, that is, the ratio of nonmarital births to all births (Smith et al. 1996).
Clearly, public policies—including welfare policies—that address the re-
treat from marriage may also slow or even reverse the rise in nonmarital
fertility and female-headed families in the United States.
Current debates on changing patterns of family formation, especially
among ethnic and racial minority groups, have centered largely on the
comparative merits of theoretical perspectives that emphasize either
men’s or women’s changing economic roles (Cherlin 1992; Oppenheimer
1997). Some argue, for example, that the rise in female headship is largely
explicable in terms of growing demographic shortages of “marriageable”
men. The deteriorating low-wage, low-skill labor market has reduced
women’s incentives to marry and has undercut the economic foundations
of existing marriages. This is most apparent among black women residing
in communities with large sex ratio imbalances and high male unemploy-
ment (Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan 1995; Wilson 1987). Other studies at-
tribute changing patterns of family formation to the improving employ-
ment circumstances of American women (McLanahan and Casper 1995;
Schultz 1994; Darity and Myers 1995). Employment and earnings presum-
ably increase women’s economic independence from men and reduce the
incentives to marry. Improved economic status also allows women to
leave unhappy marriages, unmarried mothers to live independently from
other adult family members, and pregnant unmarried women to choose
single motherhood over abortion, adoption, and marriage.
From a conceptual standpoint, the singular emphasis on either men’s
or women’s economic roles is inappropriate. These are not mutually exclu-
sive perspectives; men’s and women’s economic roles within the family
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are interrelated in fundamental ways (Oppenheimer 1997). Indeed, a
broader microeconomic perspective, one that emphasizes the rising eco-
nomic and personal costs and the declining benefits of marriage in modern
society, can subsume both (Becker 1981). The benefits from the specializa-
tion of household production along traditional gender roles—women in
home production (i.e., childbearing and child rearing) and men in labor
market activities—have declined with the changing economic roles of
women. At the same time, the main benefit of marriage for women, tradi-
tionally one of economic support from men, has eroded as the economic
position of men, especially young men with limited education or work
skills, has declined relative to women’s over the past two decades. The
implication from Becker’s rational choice model is that rising female
headship results from the blurring of traditional gender and economic
roles.
The problem with economic explanations that emphasize changing em-
ployment and earnings—of either men or women—is they are often incon-
sistent with the empirical record. For example, declining “male marriage-
ability” implies that the economic gains from traditional marriage have
declined for women. But most studies show that demographic shortages
of economically attractive men do not account for the widening racial
differences in family formation patterns, nor can they account for much
of the recent change in marriage rates or female headship (McLanahan
and Casper 1995; Lichter, LeClere, and McLaughlin 1991; Raley 1996;
McLaughlin and Lichter 1997). The study by Mare and Winship (1991)
is illustrative of this point. Among white men, roughly 20% of the decline
in marriage rates during the 1940–85 period was due to their changing
employment rates. For blacks, the role of declining “marriageable men”
is even smaller. Using metropolitan-level census data, Wood (1995)
showed that only about 4% of the 1970s decline in black marriage rates
was due to the changing local pool of adequately employed black men.
Other research eschews the current preoccupation with the changing
availability of male marriage partners but stresses instead the declining
economic “costs” of remaining single and getting divorced for women. Spe-
cifically, the economic imperative for women to marry and stay married
has diminished with rising female labor force participation and higher
real wages. Delayed marriage and divorce impose fewer economic hard-
ships than in the past on women. Moreover, employed single mothers can
afford to live apart from their families of origin (Avery, Goldscheider,
and Speare 1992). Such commonplace assertions, however, have received
mixed empirical support. McLanahan and Casper (1995) reported that,
among white women, changing employment and earnings accounted for
70% of the decline in marriage between 1970 and 1990. At the other ex-
treme, Qian and Preston (1993) found that declines in marriage were most
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pronounced during 1972–87 among the least educated women—a result
inconsistent with arguments that emphasize the changing economic roles
of women. They also suggested that change in the “force of attraction”
(i.e., unobservable change in values regarding marriage) was most respon-
sible for the retreat from marriage (see also Schoen and Kluegel 1988).
Other studies show poor women are less likely to marry than nonpoor
women (McLaughlin and Lichter 1997) and that employed women and
high wage earners have an increased rather than decreased annual proba-
bility of marriage (Oppenheimer 1994; Lichter et al. 1992).
The mixed conclusions and apparent limitations of strictly economic
explanations have revived previously discredited explanations of chang-
ing family life. This includes new research on whether the welfare state
has created economic disincentives to marriage among low-income groups
while setting into motion various adaptive or maladaptive cultural
changes (including nonmarital fertility and divorce) felt throughout soci-
ety (Moffitt 1996; Murray 1993). This resurgent interest in welfare incen-
tives is coincident with the passage of new welfare reform legislation that
includes time limits and work provisions aimed at promoting behaviors
among the poor that resonate with the deeply held American values of
hard work and “strong” families. During President Clinton’s first term,
the Department of Health and Human Services loosened the waiver pro-
cess for state experimentation with welfare programs. State experimenta-
tion with welfare and social service provisions has now been institutional-
ized through the mechanism of federal block grants to states.
An evaluation of the incentive effects of state welfare benefit levels is
clearly needed at a time when state-to-state variation in welfare provision
and generosity is expected to increase substantially over the next several
years. The existing literature on welfare incentives on the family is compli-
cated and difficult to summarize neatly. Welfare effects apparently also
have changed unpredictably over time (Moffitt 1996), further complicat-
ing the conventional wisdom.3 The theory, however, is straightforward:
Public assistance, especially cash assistance programs like AFDC, puta-
tively creates economic incentives to bear children without marriage, dis-
courages marriage, and promotes independent living among unmarried
mothers. It contributes to the retreat from marriage and the rise in female-
3 Many sociologists appear to have a much different reading of the literature than do
other social scientists. At the risk of some simplification, sociologists often downplay
the role of welfare incentives (based largely on their reading of pre-1980 studies) or
ignore welfare altogether in empirical studies because to do so would be tantamount
to “blaming the victim.” On the other hand, the more nuanced analyses of economists
regarding welfare incentive effects often come at the expense of ignoring or minimizing
other competing explanations, including cultural or value changes, gender roles, and
labor market discrimination.
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headed families among low-income women by providing a “surrogate hus-
band” in the form of a steady but modest source of income. The “antifam-
ily” effects of welfare therefore are expected to increase over time in re-
sponse to the deteriorating economic circumstances of young, less
educated adults. Welfare incentive effects also should be most apparent
among minority populations, a disproportionate share of whom are poor
and eligible for welfare.
Others reject such arguments. First, the family has been transformed
across all economic strata in America (Sweet and Bumpass 1987), a fact
that militates against monocausal explanations that emphasize the role of
welfare. Recent family trends suggest sweeping cultural shifts that have
affected virtually all segments of American society. Second, female head-
ship has increased over the past decade while real welfare benefit levels
have become less rather than more generous (Garfinkel and McLanahan
1986). If welfare benefits were the primary determinant of single headship,
theory predicts that the decline in benefit levels would have led to a de-
crease in this outcome. Third, “blaming” the welfare system for the prob-
lems of the poor (e.g., Murray 1993) is misplaced; rather, factors such as
inadequately funded schools and family-supporting social services, few
employment opportunities, racial discrimination, and neighborhood segre-
gation and isolation are seen as root causes of various adaptive behaviors,
as well as correlates of both welfare generosity and dependence. The im-
plication is that studies of welfare incentive effects must be evaluated
within a comprehensive framework that considers a variety of alternative
explanations. Such is the purpose of this article.
Moffitt’s (1992, 1995, 1996) recent comprehensive reviews of welfare
incentives draw several useful conclusions for the purpose of our study.
First, most economic studies show that welfare has significant deleterious
effects on various measures of family formation, including female head-
ship. Second, these effects have generally increased in size over the past
decade (Moffitt 1994). Third, any disincentive effect of public assistance
on family formation is not spurious, that is, it is not an artifact of the fact
that women bearing children outside of wedlock are more likely to receive
public assistance and to delay or forgo marriage (Bennett, Bloom, and
Miller 1995).4 And, fourth, welfare incentives tend to be stronger among
whites than among blacks, a finding inconsistent with public perceptions
and also puzzling in light of the larger share of blacks “at risk” of welfare
incentive effects (i.e., being eligible for welfare by virtue of low income).
Other research, however, shows that the receipt of public assistance
4 Bennett et al. (1995, p. 57) found that “welfare recipiency accounts for a small but
nontrivial portion (about one-fifth) of the negative association between nonmarital
childbearing and the subsequent likelihood of marriage.”
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among cohabiting couples lowers marital transition rates among blacks
but not whites (Manning and Smock 1995). Black women on welfare are
also more likely than white women to forgo marriage rather than marry
relatively low-status men (Lichter et al. 1995).
The debate today should not focus exclusively on whether welfare ef-
fects exist. The emphasis should instead be on the absolute size of welfare
incentives, on the size of welfare effects compared to those of other fre-
quently ignored “causes” (such as employment and sex ratio imbalances),
and on issues of statistical design for best discerning welfare incentive
effects.
THE CURRENT STUDY
From a conceptual and analytic standpoint, our article builds most di-
rectly on the recent areal study by McLanahan and Casper (1995). They
used data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples
to construct marriage market indicators for the 100 largest metropolitan
areas in the United States. They estimated a pooled regression model that
included women’s characteristics (e.g., proportion employed full-time),
men’s characteristics (e.g., median earnings), the local sex ratio, and state
welfare benefits. They found that AFDC–food stamp benefit levels were
negatively associated with metropolitan proportions currently married,
but that welfare effects were small from a substantive standpoint. Substi-
tuting the low and high levels of welfare in their regression equation re-
sulted in a difference of only about 5–7 percentage points in predicted
marriage rates. Welfare incentive effects also were small in comparison
to the effects of men’s and women’s economic circumstances.
Our analysis incorporates several important strengths of the
McLanahan-Casper study, and also of other recent cross-state, cross-
sectional analyses of local marriage markets (e.g., Fossett and Kiecolt
1992; Lichter et al. 1991), while addressing the weaknesses of each. First,
we examine the effects of changes in welfare benefit levels, skill levels,
and economic opportunities for women and men, and the local pool of
“economically attractive” spouses on family formation. This departs from
much of the existing sociological research, which downplays or ignores the
role of government assistance in marriage and family formation decisions.
Second, we examine longitudinal data aggregated over small geo-
graphic areas—counties. The use of county-level economic data confers
conceptual and statistical advantages in comparison to previous studies
that have used gross state-level measures without regard to intrastate dif-
ferences in labor market conditions or marriage opportunities (Moffitt
1994). Most marriage markets are locally circumscribed rather than de-
fined by state boundaries.
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Third, unlike McLanahan and Casper (1995), who used metropolitan
area data, we need not impute welfare benefits across multistate areas,
and we can consider family formation behavior in nonmetropolitan areas.
Our analysis is comprehensive from a geographic standpoint, covering all
counties in the 48 contiguous states.
Finally, our analysis, which uses repeated measures of both the family
formation outcome variable and the other explanatory variables, can in-
corporate county-specific fixed-effect controls for omitted variable bias.
Decisions regarding marriage and family formation are clearly more com-
plex than indicated by the simple models specified in most empirical stud-
ies. Moreover, previous research has shown that model estimates are
highly sensitive (in some instances to the point of results being eliminated
or reversed) to the inclusion of alternative controls for the processes and
variables that researchers can or cannot observe.5 Omitted variable bias
is addressed here with estimates of welfare incentive effects from county-
level panel models of female headship.
METHODS
Data
The primary data for this analysis consist of cross-sectional county records
drawn from the Summary Tape Files (STF) of the 1980 and 1990 decen-
nial censuses of the United States. We matched information for each
county across years to form a short panel. We excluded all observations
from Alaska and Hawaii because the costs of living and ethnic composi-
tion were unrepresentative of the rest of the country. Counties that had
fewer than 50 families with children under 18 in either 1980 or 1990 also
were eliminated from the analysis. The result is a pooled data set con-
taining 6,106 observations (3,053 counties matched across 1980 and 1990).6
Short descriptions as well as means and standard deviations of the vari-
ables for the total sample of counties in 1980 and 1990 are reported in
table 1.
The STF data have several features that distinguish them from the data
5 Relevant examples include Moffitt’s (1994) analysis of female headship rates and
Jackson and Klerman’s (1994) and Kane and Staiger’s (1996) analyses of young wom-
en’s fertility rates.
6 There were a small number of cases during the 1980s where new counties split off
from existing counties. For consistency, our analysis defines counties in terms of their
1980 boundaries. In some states, STF data are recorded for independent cities as well
as for counties. For small independent cities whose borders rested entirely within a
county, data for the city and county have been combined; for large cities, the analysis
includes the city-level records as if they were counties.
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Description of Variables and Simple Statistics
Mean
Variable Description 1980 1990
Female headship .......................... Percentage of family households 16.03 18.72
with children under 18 years (6.30) (6.76)
old with single female heads
Sex ratio ........................................ Ratio (3 100) of males to fe- 97.56 98.90
males, 15–59 years old (6.96) (8.03)
Male employment ........................ Percentage of male civilians em- 70.20 69.42
ployed (6.71) (6.75)
Male earnings ............................... Median income for men work- 29.94 29.05
ing full-time, full-year (1989 (5.01) (5.33)
dollars, in 1,000s)
Male education ............................ Percentage of males, 25–44 24.87 25.10
years old, with a bachelor’s (9.09) (10.00)
degree or more
Female earnings ........................... Median income for women work- 17.34 19.18
ing full-time, full-year (1989 (2.51) (3.69)
dollars, in 1,000s)
Female education ........................ Percentage of females, 25–44 17.51 22.46
years old, with a bachelor’s (6.70) (8.78)
degree or more
Percentage 65 and over .............. Percentage of the population 65 11.04 12.41
years old or older (3.44) (3.60)
Percentage black .......................... Percentage of the population 11.01 11.71
who are black (12.09) (12.67)
Percentage Hispanic .................... Percentage of the population 6.81 8.74
who are Hispanic (11.01) (13.03)
Percentage rural ........................... Percentage of the population 26.98 25.86
who reside in a rural area (27.84) (27.80)
ln(population) ............................... Natural logarithm of county 12.44 12.55
population (1.62) (1.65)
Percentage Catholic ..................... Percentage of the population 20.11 21.14
who are adherents to the (15.75) (16.48)
Catholic religion
Percentage LDS ........................... Percentage of the population 1.35 1.51
who are adherents to the (6.55) (6.93)
Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints
Percentage conservative Protes-
tant ............................................ Percentage of the population 10.93 11.30
who are adherents to strongly (11.52) (12.27)
antiabortion Protestant de-
nominations
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Mean
Variable Description 1980 1990
Maximum AFDC benefits for
family of four ........................... Maximum monthly AFDC bene- 5.65 4.60
fits for a family of four with (2.07) (1.84)
no other income (1989 dollars,
in 100s)
Average Medicaid benefits for
family of four ........................... Average state monthly Medicaid 2.90 2.57
payment for AFDC family of (.95) (.64)
four (1989 dollars, in 100s)
Maximum combined welfare
benefits ...................................... Sum of maximum AFDC and 9.14 7.48
food stamps and average Med- (1.70) (1.34)
icaid benefits for a family of
four (1989 dollars, in 100s)
Note.—Statistics based on 3,053 county-level observations in each year weighted by the no. of families
in each county. SDs appear in parentheses.
used in previous research. First, because the data for each county are
longitudinal, our study can track changes in and determinants of family
formation, including welfare payment levels both across and within coun-
ties over time. This addresses a limitation of the McLanahan-Casper study
and most previous work in this area (i.e., the failure to control for other
unobserved community or local-area variables). Second, the data allow
us to form community-based measures of marriage opportunities, gender-
specific economic opportunities, and other population characteristics.
Third, these data also provide race- and ethnicity-specific measures of
family formation and several other key variables. Accordingly, we con-
duct separate analyses for non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and Hispanics.
The race-specific data sets contain 5,800 observations (data for 2,900
counties) for non-Hispanic whites; 2,366 observations for blacks; and
1,542 observations for Hispanics. Means and standard deviations for the
race- and ethnicity-specific measures are reported in table 2.
Measurement
The dependent variable for our county-level regression analysis is the per-
centage of family households with children under 18 headed by unmarried
women.7 Using the STF data, we measure the demographic supply of men
7 Other research has sometimes examined the percentage of all women who are head-
ing families with children. Welfare effects are then interpreted as reduced-form effects
that have many different pathways to female headship: marriage or not, childbearing
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TABLE 2
Race- and Ethnicity-Specific Variables
White Black Hispanic
1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990
Female headship .................. 12.16 13.98 41.30 48.10 19.72 22.31
(3.26) (3.21) (8.81) (9.14) (9.97) (10.39)
Sex ratio ................................ 98.64 99.45 88.74 89.24 100.53 110.91
(5.50) (6.52) (20.37) (22.83) (16.25) (18.55)
Male employment ................ 71.57 71.00 58.82 57.47 71.73 70.55
(6.72) (6.58) (7.69) (8.49) (7.22) (7.67)
Male earnings ....................... 30.91 30.26 22.30 22.17 22.37 20.19
(5.04) (5.79) (5.09) (4.49) (3.88) (3.31)
Male education .................... 26.39 26.98 11.01 12.39 10.49 10.23
(9.82) (10.99) (5.27) (5.73) (6.18) (5.45)
Female earnings ................... 17.45 19.43 16.16 17.81 15.11 16.12
(2.51) (3.92) (3.24) (3.90) (1.89) (2.41)
Female education ................ 18.26 23.88 10.89 13.97 6.98 9.56
(7.30) (9.77) (4.70) (5.50) (4.24) (5.14)
No. of counties ..................... 2,900 1,189 772
Note.—Statistics in each year weighted by the no. of families of each racial/ethnic group in each
county. SDs appear in parentheses.
relative to women and the “economic attractiveness” of potential male
partners in the county. These are defined by the sex ratio, male employ-
ment rate, male earnings among full-time workers, and percentage of
college-educated men in the county (Fossett and Kiecolt 1991; Lichter et
al. 1991). The expectation is that an increasing supply of economically
attractive men is negatively related to the rise in female-headed families.
We construct similar measures of female economic independence, includ-
ing the median earnings of full-time, full-year female workers and percent-
age of college-educated women. We examine the effects of both aggregate
and race-specific measures of marriage market and gender-specific eco-
nomic and skill-level variables on female headship. Dollar-denominated
values are deflated by the Personal Consumption Deflator and expressed
in constant 1989 terms.
A main objective of the analysis is to evaluate the absolute and relative
or not, independent living or not, etc. Data limitations prevent us from exploring these
alternative pathways. In any event, the denominator in this alternative measure is not
the population at risk of receiving AFDC; it is families with children, a fact reflected in
our measure. We nevertheless have fit models with alternative measures (table A1),
and the results are discussed below.
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relationship between welfare generosity and female headship. For this,
we have matched the county-level STF records to longitudinal state-level
information on the AFDC, food stamp, and Medicaid programs (U.S.
House of Representatives 1990; U.S. Office of Family Assistance 1980;
and unpublished data from the U.S. Food and Nutrition Service and U.S.
Health Care Financing Administration). For our measures of AFDC and
food stamp generosity, we use the maximum benefit levels for a family of
four with no other income. Food stamp benefits are fixed at the national
rather than state level; by definition, they will not be associated with state-
to-state variation in changes in female headship. Food stamps may never-
theless be important because benefits under the program are reduced by
the receipt of AFDC income and thus act to narrow state-to-state varia-
tion in the overall benefits package. We use the combined benefits package
as our primary measure of welfare generosity. Following Moffitt (1992),
this is the sum of the maximum AFDC benefit, the adjusted food stamp
benefit, and .368 times the average Medicaid benefit.8
Finally, the census STF data also provide other control variables. These
include the age and racial/ethnic composition of each county, variables
that have been highly associated with family formation in previous studies
(Goldscheider and Waite 1986; Lichter et al. 1991). Moreover, unlike vir-
tually all other studies, we include both proxy and direct measures of the
cultural context of family formation. Proxy measures of urbanization
(which has many cultural manifestations) include the logarithm of county
population and the percentage of rural population, as defined by the U.S.
Census Bureau. Previous studies have shown that nonmetropolitan
women marry earlier, on average, and are less likely than urban women
to bear children outside of marriage (McLaughlin, Lichter, and Johnston
1993; Heaton, Lichter, and Amoateng 1989). These proxy measures of
cultural context are supplemented with direct measures, that is, longitudi-
nal county-level information on participation in religious organizations
with strong “profamily” orientations. Specifically, the Glenmary Research
Center (1980–92) provides county-level estimates of the number of adher-
ents and communicants for various religious denominations. We use these
data to form estimates of the percentages of the county population that
are Roman Catholic, members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter
Day Saints (the Mormon church), or members of Protestant denomina-
8 The adjusted food stamp amount is defined as maximum food stamp benefit 2 .3
max (0, maximum AFDC benefit 2 standard deduction), while the 0.368 in the com-
bined benefit formula represents the fraction of AFDC recipients who actually claim
services under the Medicaid program. The AFDC and food stamp amounts are de-
flated by the Personal Consumption Deflator, and the Medicaid amount is deflated
by the Consumer Price Index for medical services.
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tions with strong antiabortion positions.9 Winkler (1994) showed that the
effects of welfare payments are sensitive to the inclusion of measures of
“community conservatism.”
Model Specifications
The pooled regression analysis of McLanahan and Casper (1995) provides
a point of departure for our analysis. We begin with estimates from 1980–
90 pooled county-level cross-section regression models of the percentage
of families with children that are headed by females. Let yij(t) denote the
percentage of families with female heads in county i of state j in year t.
Let xij(t) denote the set of observed county- and year-specific economic
and marriage opportunity variables. Let sj(t) denote the set of state- and
year-specific welfare policy variables, and let d(t) be a dummy variable
indicating whether the observation came from 1990. The year dummy,
d(t), is used to account for “global” effects that alter the national trend in
family formation (this probably includes what Qian and Preston [1994]
have called changes in the “force of attraction”). With this notation, a
standard regression of the relationship between family formation out-
comes and local economic, marriage opportunity, and policy conditions
can be written as
yij(t) 5 β0 1 β′X xij(t) 1 β′Ssj(t) 1 βD d(t) 1 eij(t), (1)
where eij(t) represents unobserved county- and year-specific determinants
of family formation. In the results that follow, this specification is esti-
mated by applying OLS to the pooled county-level samples where each
observation is weighted by the number of families in the county.
Estimates of the coefficients in model (1) are biased if the error term,
eij(t), includes unobserved factors that are correlated with the variables
in xij(t) or sj(t). For instance, states with higher welfare benefits may be
more generous providers of education and social services generally. If this
9 The specific denominations are the Assemblies of God, Associate Reformed Presbyte-
rian Church, Christian Reformed Church, Church of God (Anderson, Indiana),
Church of God (Cleveland, Tennessee), Church of the Nazarene, Evangelical Congre-
gational Church, Free Methodist Church, Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, Mennon-
ite Church, North American Baptist Conference, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Re-
formed Church in America, Southern Baptist Convention, and Wisconsin Evangelical
Lutheran Synod. These denominations were identified by the National Right to Life
Committee (personal communication) and Bosgra (1987) as having strong antiabortion
positions. Several other denominations including the Free Will Baptists, International
Church of the Foursquare Gospel, Old Order Amish, and Wesleyans were also identi-
fied as having strong antiabortion positions; however, data were not consistently avail-
able for these groups on numbers of adherents.
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additional service spending is at the same time negatively related to head-
ship and omitted from model (1), estimates of the effect of welfare benefits
will be biased downward. Conversely, liberal (conservative) political and
social attitudes may account for both high (low) welfare spending and
high (low) rates of headship. Omitting such attitudes from regression (1)
leads to upwardly biased estimates of the effects of welfare.
To control for unobserved time-invariant factors, several recent studies
have estimated models that incorporate state-specific fixed effects. Using
the notation from specification (1), such a model can be expressed as
yij(t) 5 β′X xij(t) 1 β′Ssj(t) 1 βD d(t) 1 µj 1 e*ij (t), (2)
where µj represents a state-specific effect (with β0 suppressed, a state-
specific intercept). While the inclusion of state fixed effects likely mitigates
biases associated with unobserved state spending and institutions, the
specification does not control for unobserved variation in local determi-
nants or for interactions between omitted state and local variables.10
The availability of repeated county-level data allows us to include a
finer set of fixed-effects controls. Specifically, we estimate models of the
form
yij(t) 5 β′X xij(t) 1 β′S sj(t) 1 βDd(t) 1 µ̃ij 1 ẽij(t), (3)
which nest specification (2) as a special case. Because our primary interest
rests with the coefficients βX, βS, and βD, we can obtain consistent esti-
mates of the relevant parameters of equation (3) by applying OLS to data
that have been differenced across 1980 and 1990.11 For purposes of compa-
rability, we estimate variants of specifications (1), (2), and (3). However,
on the basis of specification tests for the inclusion of county-specific versus
state-specific or no fixed effects, the general model (3) is our preferred
specification in the subsequent empirical analysis.
RESULTS
Changes in Female Headship
The percentage of families headed by females continued its steady rise
during the 1980s. The weighted county data in table 1 indicate that the
10 The use of the word likely is purposeful here as the use of fixed effects may exacer-
bate biases associated with other statistical problems such as measurement error in
the explanatory variables or omitted local-level variables.
11 Even after differencing, there still may be spatial correlation in the errors because
of the clustering of counties within states. To account for this, we report estimates
from feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) models that incorporate controls for
within-state correlation.
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percentage of female-headed families increased from 16.03% to 18.72%
between 1980 and 1990, an absolute increase of 2.69% and a relative in-
crease of 16.7%.12 On both an absolute and percentage basis, the increase
was largest among black women, whose headship rates rose from 41.30%
to 48.10% (table 2). The increase among Hispanics was more similar to
that of whites than blacks.
Over the same period, average real AFDC benefit levels declined by
$105, or 19%. In terms of the combined benefits package, the decline in
AFDC generosity was reinforced by a slight drop over the decade in aver-
age Medicaid benefits but partially mitigated by the income adjustment
for food stamps. On net, the evidence is still one of substantial cutbacks
in the real value of the welfare “safety net.” The average combined
monthly benefit dropped by $166, or 18%, over the decade.
Averages reweighted to reflect the different residential distributions of
racial and ethnic groups (not shown) further reveal that black families
were more likely to live in states with lower-than-average welfare benefits
in both 1980 and 1990. The paradox is that female headship increased,
especially among blacks, during a period of decline in AFDC and of diver-
gence in the welfare safety net that increasingly favored whites over
blacks. This pattern of decline provides strong evidence against the argu-
ment that welfare was responsible for the rise over the decade in female-
headed families.
Pooled Cross-Sectional Models of Female-Headed Families
Like the McLanahan-Casper study, our initial model (shown in the first
column of table 3) provides estimates of welfare incentive effects from a
1980–90 pooled regression specified as in equation (1). Consistent with
theory, this conventional analysis indicates that the association between
welfare benefits and female headship is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. At the same time, the effects are arguably small from a substantive
standpoint: a $100 change in welfare payments is associated with slightly
less than a one percentage point change in female headship. To give a
more extreme example, if monthly AFDC payments had been completely
eliminated and not offset by any change in food stamps or Medicaid (i.e.,
if the average monthly combined benefits package had decreased by $565
instead of $166 over the decade), the results indicate that headship rates
would have indeed fallen but only by about half a percentage point.
A criticism of previous cross-section research is that estimates of the
12 Since the county data are weighted by the number of families in the county, these
weighted averages are algebraically equivalent to the population estimates of the per-
centage of female-headed families for the United States.
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Determinants of Female Headship Regressions with Alternative Area
Controls, 1980–90
No Area State County
Variable Effects Effectsa Effectsb
Maximum combined welfare benefits ............. .817*** .392*** .838***
(.036) (.105) (.214)
Sex ratio .............................................................. 2.178*** 2.171*** 2.076***
(.005) (.005) (.008)
Male earnings ..................................................... 2.421*** 2.403*** 2.092***
(.016) (.016) (.023)
Male education ................................................... 2.007 .048*** .045**
(.018) (.017) (.017)
Male employment ............................................... 2.285*** 2.270*** 2.161***
(.008) (.009) (.014)
Female earnings ................................................. .317*** .306*** 2.432***
(.035) (.034) (.040)
Female education ............................................... .014 2.041*** 2.159***
(.020) (.020) (.018)
Percentage 65 and over ..................................... 2.185*** 2.123*** 2.135***
(.014) (.015) (.034)
Percentage black ................................................ .271*** .316*** .257***
(.004) (.005) (.017)
Percentage Hispanic .......................................... 2.001 .027*** 2.147***
(.004) (.005) (.017)
Percentage rural ................................................. 2.087*** 2.077*** 2.019**
(.003) (.003) (.008)
ln(population) ..................................................... .241*** .383*** 22.015***
(.047) (.049) (.336)
Percentage Catholic ........................................... 2.038*** 2.060*** 2.025***
(.003) (.004) (.005)
Percentage LDS .................................................. 2.039*** 2.063*** .121**
(.006) (.016) (.055)
Percentage conservative Protestant ................. 2.042*** 2.011** 2.052***
(.004) (.005) (.016)
Dummy1990 ........................................................... 3.029*** 2.465*** 6.053***
(.141) (.205) (.387)
R2 ......................................................................... .834 .862 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Note.—Results based on 6,106 county-level observations from 1980 and 1990 weighted by the no. of
families in each county. Dependent variable is percentage of families with children under 18 years old
with single female heads. SEs appear in parentheses.
a The 49 state effects are jointly significant at the .01 level.
b The 3,053 county effects are jointly significant at the .01 level.
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
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effects of public assistance may be spurious, a result from excluding other
state-level variables associated both with welfare generosity and female
headship from the model. The model presented in the second column ad-
dresses this concern by including 48 state dummy variables as controls for
unmeasured state-level effects (DiPrete and Forristal 1994).13 Specification
tests reveal that the state dummy variables are jointly significant at the
.01 level. More important, their addition leads to a substantial (more than
50%) reduction in the estimated effect of welfare. Although the coefficient
remains significantly positive, each additional $100 change in welfare ben-
efits is now estimated to lead to only a .392 percentage point change in
female-headed family households. Estimates of the coefficients for several
other variables including men’s and women’s education and the religious
affiliation variables are also very sensitive to the inclusion of state fixed
effects. On balance, the concerns expressed in the existing literature about
potential biases from omitted variables, even in models such as ours that
are augmented by a relatively rich and detailed set of observed control
variables, appear to be well founded (cf. Moffitt 1994; McLanahan and
Casper 1995).
Change Models of Female-Headed Families with County Fixed Effects
Our results so far indicate that welfare benefit levels significantly affect
the percentage of female-headed families with children, even when other
unobserved state effects are controlled. These models do not, however,
take full advantage of the longitudinal county-level data. The possible
effects of county-specific unobserved heterogeneity are addressed in the
model presented in the final column of table 3, which differences each of
the county-level observations over time.14 This model provides an estimate
of the effect of changing public assistance on intradecade changes in fe-
male headship at the county level, while controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity between both states and counties (DiPrete and Forristal 1994)
as well as for observed changes in local area sex ratio imbalances, local
economic opportunities, and cultural factors.15 As with the previous speci-
13 In studies using data from a single point in time, the state dummies and welfare
variables would be redundant and welfare effects could not be estimated. This is not
the case using pooled data. Each state has two unique welfare variables (i.e., for 1980
and 1990), allowing us to estimate a state welfare effect independent of state effects.
14 In this first-difference model, the dependent variable is the difference between the
1980 and 1990 percentages of families with children that were headed by women.
The independent variables are similarly differenced. In terms of the coefficients for
the variables of substantive interest, the specification is equivalent to having run a
regression on the pooled sample with 3,052 county dummy variables.
15 These models were estimated using the HML/2L computer program. This package
does not include an estimate of R2 from the model.
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fication, estimation reveals that the additional fixed effect controls are
jointly significant and that their inclusion leads to substantive changes in
several of the coefficients of interest.
The county fixed-effects model produces estimates of the association
between welfare and female headship that are much closer to pooled re-
gression estimates from column 1 in table 3 than the state fixed effects
estimates from column 2. Specifically, each $100 change in welfare bene-
fits is associated with an .838 percentage point change in the county female
headship rate. When we combine this point estimate with the actual de-
crease in welfare benefits over the decade, the change in welfare policy
is calculated to have depressed headship rates by 1.4%. The finding of a
significant positive association between welfare and headship is all the
more striking because we have fit our model for female headship among
all families with children, not simply for the low-income, potentially eligi-
ble population. Models estimated for such a targeted population would
likely produce even stronger results than those reported here.16
Our difference model also is the first of its kind to examine the effects
of changing local marriage market conditions on family formation for the
1980s. It builds directly on previous pooled cross-sectional analyses
of 1980 and 1990 census data (Lichter et al. 1991; McLanahan and Casper
1995) and on Wood’s (1995) study, which was restricted to the metropoli-
tan black population using change data computed from the 1970 and 1980
censuses. Our results reveal significant effects of changing marriage mar-
ket conditions on the 1980s rise in female-headed families.
Specifically, the estimates indicate that the sex ratio is negatively associ-
ated with female headship; areas with relatively fewer men to women
have higher rates of female headship than do other areas. These effects,
though, are small from a substantive standpoint with the coefficient im-
plying that a decline of 13 men for every 100 women would be necessary
to raise the female headship rate by a single percentage point. Men’s em-
ployment and earnings are significantly negatively associated with female
16 Our analysis has focused primarily on the effects of welfare benefits overall, without
regard to the “packaging” of benefits. In some additional analyses (available upon
request), we fit difference models (with county effects) that included the maximum
AFDC benefits for a family of four and the average Medicaid benefits received by
AFDC recipients separately. Our evaluation assesses claims that the rise in female
headship reflects the pernicious effects of Medicaid, which provides medical coverage
that is typically unavailable in the low-wage jobs held by low-income women. The
results provided a straightforward conclusion: Welfare incentive effects result from
changes in AFDC rather than Medicaid payment levels. The effects of changes in
average Medicaid payment levels were not associated with changes in female headship
for the sample of all counties, nor in the race disaggregated samples of whites, blacks,
and Hispanics. There is little evidence here that Medicaid payment levels promoted
the rise in female-headed families over the past decade.
129
American Journal of Sociology
headship. The magnitudes of these estimated effects, however, are again
comparatively small: a 10% change in the male employment rate (an abso-
lute change of 7 percentage points) is associated with a 1.1 percentage
point change in headship while a 10% swing in male earnings is associated
with only a .3 percentage point change (by way of contrast, the change
in female headship associated with a 10% change in welfare payments is
.7 percentage points). The results while modest nevertheless imply that
the supply of marriageable men influences women’s decisions to bear or
raise children outside of marriage.
One piece of evidence that potentially contradicts this hypothesis is the
small but signficantly positive coefficient on the percentage of men in the
county who have completed at least a bachelor’s degree. To the extent
that this variable serves as a proxy for long-term wage opportunities, the
positive coefficient runs counter to the marriage market explanation.
However, to the extent that the variable reflects either a shortage of mar-
riageble teenage and young adult men, liberal attitudes regarding sexual
activity, or progressive attitudes about and a willingness to provide child
support, the coefficient can be reconciled with our other results.
The results from the county fixed-effects model fail to support the fe-
male “independence hypothesis” but do support economic hypotheses re-
garding family formation processes. This represents strong support for
Oppenheimer (1994), who claims that the recent emphasis on the deleteri-
ous effects of women’s improved economic status on the family is over-
drawn. Specifically, our estimates indicate that women’s earnings and ed-
ucation are significantly negatively related to female headship. Previous
cross-section research on the effects of women’s changing economic roles
on various family formation outcomes has been mixed with a large num-
ber of economic studies finding negative effects of female economic oppor-
tunities (see the review by Montgomery and Trussell [1986]) but with sev-
eral sociological and some economic studies finding positive effects (see,
e.g., McLanahan and Casper 1995; Lichter et al. 1991; Matthews, Ribar,
and Wilhelm 1997). The estimated magnitudes of these associations are
also much larger than those for the male earnings and education variables,
in the case of the earnings variable nearly five times as large. The school-
ing results are consistent with higher levels of education increasing wom-
en’s access to economically attractive marital partners, increasing their
attractiveness to potential marital partners, and thus increasing the qual-
ity and stability of marriages generally (South 1991; Lichter et al. 1995).
As expected, high rates of female headship are significantly associated
with urbanization (see also McLaughlin and Lichter 1997), high concen-
trations of blacks and young people, and local population declines. The
percentages of Hispanics, Catholics, and antiabortion Protestants in the
county, on the other hand, are negatively associated with the percentage
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of families headed by women. A counterintuitive finding is that changes
in the percentage of Mormons are positively associated with female head-
ship. This last result notwithstanding, it is clear that changes in the demo-
graphic and cultural character of local areas affect the concentration of
female headship, independent of changes in economic conditions.
Finally, the intercept from the differenced model can be interpreted
analogously to the dummy variables in our previous specifications indicat-
ing whether the observation pertains to 1980 or 1990 (coded “1” if 1990).
If the year effect is zero, the appropriate inference is that the 1980s rise
in female-headed households with children was due entirely to changes
in the state and county characteristics considered here. But, as shown in
table 3, the net year effect of 6.053 is large and statistically significant in
the model. In contrast, the percentage of family households (with children)
headed by females increased by 2.68 percentage points, on average, be-
tween 1980 and 1990 (table 1). The significant time coefficient means that
neither county compositional changes nor changing state welfare policy
can explain the 1980s rise in female-headed families. In fact, current short-
run demographic and economic trends have muted the upward rise. Other
explanations clearly must be entertained, including cultural ones that em-
phasize changing family values or rising individualism.17
In some additional analyses (table A1), we evaluated the sensitivity of
our results using three alternative measures of family structure. Previous
research on welfare is often unclear about measurement issues (e.g.,
whether subfamilies are defined as families) or the unit of analysis (i.e.,
percentage of women heading families with children or percentage of fam-
ilies with children that are headed by women). Such differences may con-
tribute to differences from study to study in reported welfare effects. Our
sensitivity analysis focused on three alternative measures: (1) percentage
of women heading family households with children, (2) percentage of fam-
ilies (including subfamilies) with children headed by women, and (3) per-
centage of women heading families (including subfamilies) with children.
Regardless of measure used, estimates from county fixed-effect models
(models specified along the lines of eq. [3]) revealed statistically significant
and positive effects of changes in welfare benefit levels on the change in
female headship. The welfare incentive effects are thus robust with re-
spect to alternative measures of female headship. Our findings regarding
17 The coefficient on the time trend is more properly interpreted as a residual that
incorporates all of the trends that we have either omitted or improperly measured.
So the trends in low-income wages, the availability and relative value of other forms
of public assistance, child care and child support policies, the lifetime parity of married
and single mothers, etc., are all potential contributors to this residual along with the
cultural trends described in the text.
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the negative effects of the sex ratio, men’s employment, and women’s
economic opportunities were also robust to changes in the specification
of the dependent variable, while our findings regarding men’s earnings
and education were somewhat more sensitive.
Female Headship among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics
The clear and consistent relationships between welfare and female head-
ship for the total sample are not observed for each of the racial and ethnic
groups considered here. The estimates from the 1980–90 difference or
county-effects models reported in table 4 are based on counties with sig-
nificant populations (more than 50 families) of whites, blacks, and His-
panics. The results, which have controlled for unobserved heterogeneity
among counties, indicate significant positive effects of welfare benefit
sums on female headship among blacks but not among whites and His-
panics. For blacks, the welfare effect (1.294) is over four times larger than
the nonsignificant effect for whites (.302). This effect implies that each
$100 change in welfare benefits is associated with a 1.294 change in the
percentage of family households with children headed by females. Alter-
natively, this means that counties with the largest welfare cuts experi-
enced relatively slower increases in female headship over the decade. For
blacks, the observed welfare effect implies that average black female
headship would decline from the observed percentage of 48.10% to
43.01%, a 5.09 percentage point drop, if welfare payments were cut in half.
Such results suggest that even large cuts in welfare benefits will produce
relatively small declines in female headship for blacks. They will yield no
change in female headship for whites or Hispanics.
The other results in table 4 reinforce previous research that emphasizes
deteriorating marriage market conditions as a causative factor in the rise
in female-headed families. For each racial/ethnic group, increases over
1980–90 in the ratio of men to women and increases in men’s earnings,
education, and employment were associated with slower increases (or
even declines) in female headship. But the effects of shortages of economi-
cally attractive men were strongest among minority populations. For ex-
ample, each percentage point increase in black men’s and Hispanic men’s
employment during the 1980s was associated with a .252 and .287 percent-
age point decline, respectively, in female headship. This compares with
a .099 percentage decline in white female headship for each percentage
point increase in white men’s employment. Similarly, the effect of men’s
earnings on female headship was over twice as large for blacks and His-
panics. Clearly, our results indicate that changes in local economic circum-
stances played an especially large role in the rise in minority female-
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Determinants of Female Headship by Race/Ethnicity
Variable White Black Hispanic
Maximum combined welfare benefits ..... .302 1.294** 2.111
(.198) (.611) (.803)
Sex ratio ...................................................... 2.080*** 2.041*** 2.092***
(.008) (.009) (.010)
Male earnings ............................................. 2.151*** 2.346*** 2.164**
(.020) (.066) (.066)
Male education .......................................... .022 2.058 .101**
(.015) (.045) (.047)
Male employment ...................................... 2.099*** 2.252*** 2.287***
(.013) (.029) (.030)
Female earnings ......................................... 2.397*** 2.265** .064
(.034) (.098) (.110)
Female education ...................................... 2.132*** 2.095** 2.146***
(.015) (.045) (.050)
Percentage 65 and over ............................ 2.040 .058 .181
(.031) (.121) (.144)
Percentage black ........................................ .011 2.259*** .154*
(.018) (.044) (.085)
Percentage Hispanic .................................. 2.076*** 2.163** 2.110**
(.016) (.060) (.051)
Percentage rural ......................................... 2.016** .009 2.074*
(.007) (.037) (.039)
ln(population) ............................................. .582 25.104*** .657
(.301) (1.357) (1.390)
Percentage Catholic ................................... 2.018*** 2.011 2.010
(.005) (.026) (.013)
Percentage LDS ......................................... .107** .463 .754***
(.049) (.428) (.274)
Percentage conservative Protestant ......... 2.021 .085 2.077
(.014) (.064) (.094)
Dummy1990 ................................................... 3.820*** 9.819*** 3.303**
(.359) (1.075) (1.558)
Observations .............................................. 5,800 2,366 1,542
Note.—Dependent variable is percentage of families with children under 18 years old with single
female heads. Regressions include controls for county-specific effects and are weighted by the no. of
families in each racial/ethnic group. SEs appear in parentheses.
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
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headed families in the 1980s, a result consistent with previous research
(Mare and Winship 1991).
The observed effects of women’s changing economic circumstances on
family formation similarly reinforces the (too often ignored) theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence of Oppenheimer (1994), that is, that
women’s improving earnings and education promoted marriage rather
than created disincentive to marriage or female independence from men.
Indeed, for both white and black women, improvements in earnings were
negatively associated with 1980–90 increases in female-headed families.
These estimated effects, however, were generally larger and more precise
among white women than among blacks and Hispanics. This is not sur-
prising in light of existing racial and ethnic differentials in female educa-
tion and earnings; fewer benefits in the form of lower female headship
are likely to be observed if the education and earnings distributions are
truncated at the top among minority women.
In sum, our models (with county fixed effects) indicate that welfare ben-
efit levels are positively associated with the rise in female headship under
varying model specifications and in race specific models for blacks. At the
same time, our results highlight the importance of local economic opportu-
nities, especially among men, in promoting traditional patterns of family
formation. Clearly, neither monocausal explanations that focus on welfare
incentives nor explanations that emphasize jobs and earnings can fully
account for recent increases in female headship. From a policy standpoint,
this is perhaps discouraging because it implies that cultural changes—
such as value shifts—may partly underlie recent trends (Popenoe 1996).
Attitudes and values are difficult to reverse by public policy, even if con-
sensus about the need for such change exists.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, welfare reform is on the public policy and
state legislative agenda. Our study revisits the subject of possible links
between changing national and state welfare policy and the rise in female-
headed families—a timely but contentious subject that has been given
surprisingly little systematic empirical attention in the sociological litera-
ture over the past decade.18 Our multilevel analysis of the multiple causes
18 The voice of social science research has not often been heard in this debate. It has
been drowned out by a much louder and more passionate public voice of concern
about the “breakdown of the family” and the possible contributing role of welfare
dependency. This is not surprising. Sociologists typically have shied away from sensi-
tive or controversial public policy issues that might seem to “blame the victim,” that
might promote racial stereotypes, or that might generate empirical evidence support-
ing a conservative political agenda. For example, Massey’s (1995) recent review essay
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of the rise in female-headed families is especially appropriate at a time
when state and federal welfare reform initiatives seek to restore “strong
families,” reduce nonmarital fertility, and promote economic indepen-
dence among poor women.
Our analyses of changing female headship provided strong and consis-
tent evidence that state welfare benefit levels were associated with
changes in female headship over the 1980–90 period. Previous studies
using state fixed-effects models of female headship have produced incon-
clusive results for the 1960s (Ellwood and Bane 1985) or have showed
that state welfare benefit effects are nonsignificant (for 1968–89) when
unobserved state-level variables are controlled (Moffitt 1994). Our fixed-
effects analysis, which controlled for both unobserved state and county
heterogeneity, indicated instead that areas with larger declines in welfare
benefits had significantly slower increases in the percentage of families
headed by unmarried mothers. Moreover, the welfare incentive effects
observed here may in fact be underestimated if welfare has lagged effects
on family decision-making processes (Murray 1993; Moffitt 1994). Family
formation behaviors may respond slowly to changing welfare policy as
perceptions of welfare benefit levels catch up with the reality of recent
welfare cuts. They also may be underestimated for certain high-risk popu-
lations. For example, marriage rates were lowest in the 1980s for young,
poor, and less educated women, a group that contributed dispropor-
tionately to recent increases in female-headed families and may have
been influenced most by welfare availability (Qian and Preston 1993;
McLaughlin and Lichter 1997).19
Our study perhaps built most directly on the cross-sectional study by
McLanahan and Casper (1995) by further explicating the role of welfare
incentives in the family formation process. First, ours is the first compre-
hensive study for the 1980s to pit explanations that emphasize state wel-
fare incentives against those that stress the deteriorating economic attrac-
tiveness of male marriage partners and the rising economic independence
of women. We show that the effects of changing welfare benefits existed
under a variety of alternative and rigorous model specifications for all
(rather than only metro) counties. The robustness of our results for the
1980s also reinforce recent speculation that welfare incentive effects may
have increased since the 1970s (Moffitt 1996).
of The Bell Curve argues that the attention received by this book can be traced directly
to the policy vacuum left by sociologists.
19 Some support for this argument was found in additional analyses (not reported) that
revealed a significant negative interaction effect of welfare and education on female
headship. The substantive interpretation is that welfare effects were largest in the
counties with the least educated population, a result consistent with arguments sug-
gesting larger welfare effects among the poor.
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Second, welfare incentive effects during the 1980s were especially large
for blacks (a result similarly shown but not discussed by McLanahan and
Casper [1995]), while the effects for whites and Hispanics were insignifi-
cant. Such results for the 1980s contrast with previous research that typi-
cally showed that welfare effects were larger for whites than for blacks
(see Moffitt 1995). The welfare incentive effects observed here for blacks
are consistent with the larger share of poor and welfare-dependent persons
in the black population. By virtue of their lower economic status alone,
blacks should be more responsive to changing welfare benefit levels. The
race-disaggregated results from our county fixed-effect models therefore
help reconcile the theoretically anomalous results of previous studies.
Third, conventional economic arguments, including those that empha-
size employment or welfare, cannot account for recent upswings in female-
headed families with children. The “period” effects in our pooled regres-
sion models were invariably large and statistically significant. Female
headship increased between 1980 and 1990, net of 1980–90 compositional
changes in the sex ratio, the economic circumstances of men and women,
or welfare. The fact that the size of the period effect exceeded the actual
1980–90 percentage point change in female headship indicates that recent
demographic and economic changes may have contributed, on balance,
to otherwise even larger increases in female headship over the past decade.
In the end, welfare was not the primary or even a key factor responsible
for the recent upswing in female headship. The estimated welfare incen-
tive effects implied that even very large cuts in welfare payment levels
would produce only a relatively small drop in the rate of female family
headship. Little evidence exists to support the apparently widely held per-
ception that welfare is largely responsible for the breakdown of the tradi-
tional married-couple family.
Clearly, other explanations for the rise in female-headed families are
required and await additional study. For example, until recently, cultural
explanations have had a bad reputation, one born of 1960s debates about
a “culture of poverty” and the Moynihan report. Cultural arguments
seemed to blame the poor themselves (e.g., “tangle of pathology”) for their
unfortunate economic circumstances (for cultural discussions, see Cherlin
[1992] and Pagnini and Morgan [1996]). As in previous studies, our results
also lend themselves to possible cultural interpretations.20 Such explana-
20 “Residual” evidence supporting the so-called minority-group hypothesis provides a
similar example. Studies show that the higher fertility among minority women cannot
be explained with standard social (e.g., education) and economic (e.g., income) vari-
ables. The usual inference is that this unexplained residual variation in fertility must
then be due to unmeasured cultural differences between majority and minority groups.
Such a residual interpretation also is used when differences in income between groups
(e.g., blacks and whites, men and women) cannot be explained by objective human
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tions are implied by increases in female headship even after adjusting for
1980–90 shifts in conventional social and economic variables (e.g., grow-
ing shortages of marriageable men). A cultural argument—one based on
observed race differences—also is indicated by the disproportionate in-
crease in female-headed families in counties with increasing black popula-
tions, holding marriage market and other local economic conditions con-
stant. One interpretation, then, is that the effects of changing welfare and
economic factors reported here represent only small deviations from an
otherwise upward trend in female headship across many segments of
American society.
Some observers have argued that the retreat from the traditional family
is a result of the widespread rise in individualism at the expense of the
collectivity, changing mores regarding sexuality and unmarried cohabita-
tion, and the declining stigma associated with unmarried pregnancy and
motherhood (Bumpass 1990; Thornton 1995; Popenoe 1996). Indeed, only
about one-third of young people today agree that it is better to get married
than to spend one’s life being single, and three-fifths express moral accep-
tance of cohabitation before marriage (Thornton 1989). Moreover, black
Americans—especially black men—are less likely than their white coun-
terparts to indicate a desire to marry (South 1993). And, unlike white
women, black women typically suffer little stigma from unmarried
childbearing (Pagnini and Morgan 1996). Blacks also are less likely to
marry than Mexican Americans, a group that shares the disadvantaged
economic circumstances of blacks but not the same familial cultural tradi-
tions (Oropesa, Lichter, and Anderson 1994). Of course, any distinctive
features of contemporary black family life may be cultural adaptations
and a legacy of historical circumstances, including spatial and social isola-
tion, chronic economic deprivation, peer group attachments, and gender
role dissonance (Pagnini and Morgan 1996; Lloyd and South 1996; Schoen
and Kluegel 1988). By their very nature, such sweeping cultural interpre-
tations often defy empirical study.
Whatever its etiology, our focus on the growth of family households
headed by unmarried women with children is clearly appropriate. Current
welfare debates and nascent state welfare legislation remain targeted at
needy unmarried women with children. Our estimates of welfare incentive
effects must nevertheless be regarded as reduced-form effects; as in previ-
ous studies, we have ignored the multiple pathways through which wel-
fare may have contributed to the rise in female-headed families with chil-
dren (Ellwood and Bane 1985). Welfare incentive effects on female
headship may operate indirectly through increased nonmarital childbear-
capital or job-related characteristics. Here, the residual interpretation is usually one
of unmeasured overt or subtle race or gender discrimination.
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ing (Moffitt 1995), lower marriage or remarriage rates (McLanahan and
Casper 1995), more independent living among unmarried women with
children (Wilson 1987), a lower likelihood of resolving premarital preg-
nancies through abortion or marriage (Lundberg and Plotnick 1990), or
more cohabitation at the expense of marriage (Manning and Smock 1995;
Raley 1996). Different state welfare reform initiatives may have much
different and perhaps offsetting effects on the various demographic path-
ways to female headship and poverty (Lichter and Gardner 1996–97). Our
results should be regarded as a first step toward a fuller understanding
of the etiology of family formation behaviors.
Finally, the current devolution of the federal welfare system to the
states implies considerable potential for future increases in state-to-state
variation in welfare policy and benefit levels. The United States currently
may be undergoing a process of increased territorial differentiation—a
balkanization across geographic space of cultural and economic groups
(Frey 1995; Lichter 1992). The future may yield growing spatial heteroge-
neity in family formation processes, including the rise of female-headed
families, that reinforce existing economic disparities over geographic
space (Massey 1996). Indeed, the welfare incentive effects observed here
may grow over time as state welfare policies further differentiate one state
from another.
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TABLE A1
Determinants of Female Headship: Alternative Headship Measures
Household Family
Headship Family Headship
Variable per Woman Headship per Woman
Maximum combined welfare benefits ....... .378*** 1.021*** .538***
(.099) (.262) (.117)
Sex ratio ........................................................ 2.026*** 2.084*** 2.034***
(.004) (.008) (.004)
Male earnings ............................................... 2.010 2.113*** 2.008
(.011) (.024) (.013)
Male education ............................................. 2.008 .080*** .033***
(.008) (.018) (.010)
Male employment ......................................... 2.086*** 2.167*** 2.106***
(.007) (.014) (.008)
Female earnings ........................................... 2.248*** 2.314*** 2.225***
(.019) (.041) (.022)
Female education ......................................... 2.078*** 2.199*** 2.133***
(.009) (.019) (.010)
Percentage 65 and over ............................... 2.044*** 2.142*** 2.123***
(.016) (.035) (.018)
Percentage black .......................................... .051*** .324*** .129***
(.008) (.017) (.009)
Percentage Hispanic .................................... 2.076*** 2.030* 2.005
(.008) (.017) (.009)
Percentage rural ........................................... 2.008** 2.019** 2.010**
(.004) (.008) (.004)
ln(population) ............................................... 2.244 23.098*** 21.439***
(.161) (.350) (.186)
Percentage Catholic ..................................... 2.014*** 2.015*** 2.009***
(.002) (.005) (.003)
Percentage LDS ............................................ .086*** .082 .062*
(.028) (.058) (.033)
Percentage conservative Protestant ........... 2.006 2.067*** 2.023**
(.008) (.016) (.009)
Dummy1990 ..................................................... 2.386*** 7.566*** 3.811***
(.179) (.472) (.213)
Mean of the dependent variable:
1980 ............................................................ 6.919 18.049 8.018
1990 ............................................................ 7.614 22.216 9.668
Note.—The weight for the first and third columns is women 15–44 years old. The weight for the
second column is families with children. Regressions include controls for county-specific effects. SEs
appear in parentheses.
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
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